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ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY; The Indonesian Experience* Print E-mail
Written by Azyumardi Azra   
Thursday, 23 October 2008 22:10

 Indonesian Islam, no doubt, since its early history in the late 12 is basically a moderate and tolerant Islam. This is due not only to the peaceful penetration and spread of Islam in the Indonesian archipelago, but also to social and cultural systems of the Indonesian people. Therefore, social, cultural, and political expression of Islam in Indonesia is quite distinctive if one compares with Islam somewhere else.

Despite its cultural, social, and political distinctions, Indonesian Islam is no less Islamic compares with Islam in other areas of the Muslim world. Indonesian Muslims subscribes to the very same fundamental beliefs of Islam as laid down by the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, which later were elaborated and formulated by authoritative and recognized ` ulama(Muslim religious scholars). Indonesian Muslims also practice Islamic rituals like Muslims in other areas. If there are some differences, they are only in small or even trivial matters (furu`iyyah), not in fundamental teachings of Islam." theory.

According to this theorybased on  Clifford Geertzdivisions of "santri" (strict Muslims), "abangan" (nominal Muslims) and "priyayi" (aristocracy)Indonesian politics was heavily divided along religious line and traditional loyalty. Sociological and religious changes that have been taking place since that last decade of Soehartos rule have contributed to the rapid demise of the politik aliran. Indonesian politics, since the the reform era, has been characterized by less and less politik aliran. In contrast what has characterized Indonesian politics since then is interest" if not "opportunist politics".

The election of SBY-JK clearly shows"secular" person, he is known in Indonesia as good and"conspiracy theory" seems to decreasing. Virtually all  Therefore, it is wrong to assume that Indonesian Islam is theologically, octrinally, and ritually peripheral vis-à-vis Islam the places and developed. But that should not lead one to argue that Indonesian Islam is also a  politics that religious line is no longer relevant. Though SBY has been called by some international media as a practicing Muslim; while JK on the other hand has long been known as having more Islamic credentials, being the former leader of HMI (Association of University Muslim Students), for instance.

Thirdly; despite the 9/9 bomb blast, Indonesian Islam remains moderate and tolerant Islam. The bomb has in fact contributed to a more resolute and stronger attitude among Indonesian Muslims in general to confront radicalism; more and more Muslims abandon the defensive and apologetic attitude towards the ruthlessness of the perpetrators of the bombing. The belief among some people of the so-called Muslim leaders issued statements in strongest terms ever to condemn the bombing.

The police investigation of the bombing makes it clear that the “intellectualist actors” of the bombings in Indonesia in the last several years are  Malaysian—DR Azahari and Noordin M. Top—who recruited some misled Indonesians. While Azahari was killed during a siege by Indonesian police in Batu, Malang, East Java, on November 9, 2005, Noordin remains at large; he is, for sure, will continue recruit potential suicide bombers, and create security problems in Indonesia. Looking at Azahari and Noordin case, therefore, there is strong tendency that radical and militant groups or terrorist groups are foreign-led, rather than home-grown ones. This again, confirms that Indonesian Muslims are basically moderate and tolerant Muslims; but they must be aware of negative foreign influence brought in by foreign Muslims, especially on young Muslims.

With that kind of development both at the societal and government levels, the bomb blasts in Kuningan, Jakarta, and Bali II on October 1, 2005, has forced other

radical groups to further lay low. It is no secret that a good number of suspected people have been arrested by the police after the disclosure of the networks of the perpetrators of Bali bombing I three years ago; more alleged terrorists were detained and brought to justice after Marriott bombing in Jakarta; and more of them have been put into police custody in the aftermath of the Kuningan and Bali II bombings.

Therefore, one of the most important keys to address terrorism in Indonesia is more stringent law enforcement; the professionalism and credibility of the police in the investigation of the perpetrators of bombing and other kind of terrorism is very crucial in addressing terrorism. With public support, the police are now in a better position to decisively act in the war against terrorism. Not least important is the support of civil society organizations—particularly moderate Muslim organizations—in the fight against terrorism. An encouraging development took place in the aftermath of Bali bombing II. In
conjunction with the post-Ramadhan and Id al-Fitr celebrations, Vice President MJK met at his official residence with a number of Muslim leaders, including from the NU, Muhammadiyah and MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/the Council of Indonesian `Ulama), and representatives from other organizations. During the meeting, Vice President also showed a video tape of the perpetrators of Bali blast II who had military training and messages for their families before they conducted the suicide bombing.

The end result of the meeting was the formation of the Team of Anti-Terrorism (Tim Penanggulangan Terorism/TPT) led by KH Ma’ruf Amin, a respected `ulama’ from the MUI. He is assisted by a number of vicechairpersons from the NU, Muhammadiyah, DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia/the Indonesian Council of Islamic Preaching) and Ministry of Religious Affairs. The team has decided to launch a number programs; firstly, disseminating the true teaching of jihad from national to grass-root levels through Muslim organizations, and educational institutions; secondly, researching literature on misleading concept on jihad in order to provide counter-discourse; developing cooperation with related institutions in countering terrorism.
 

Conclusion

There is a lot of signs that Indonesia under President SBY is more likely to be more stable. The expectation towards the new national leadership basically continues to run high in Indonesia. One of the most important keys for President SBY and Vice-President MJK to get stronger support from the people is their ability to form a cabinet that could win the widest possible public acceptability. For many, it is disappointing that SBY-JK cabinet consists of some ministers that are lacking of credibility and professionalism in their field. President SBY seemed to have been very compromising with political parties in particular. President SBY also failed to satisfy public in general when he did a partial reshuffle of his cabinet in early December, 2004.

Despite this problem, so far is still quite good for President SBY; and it seems that he is able to lead Indonesia on the right way. One of his greatest challenges is the possible tension and conflict between him and the “Nation Coalition” which dominates the seats in the Parliament (DPR). But, one has to admit, that the Nation Coalition is indeed very fragile. The interest or opportunist politics among Parliament members and party politics, however, makes it possible for the SBY government to run with minimum opposition from and conflict with the DPR.

The SBY theme of K2A (Konsiliasi, Konsolidasi, Aksi, or Conciliation, Consolidation, and Action) could be very appropriate and a smart move for President SBY to anticipate maneuvers against him from the DPR. Furthermore, the election of Vice-President MJK as the chairperson of Golkar Party that has the largest number of seats in DPR, has significantly reduced the possible head on collision between President SBY administration and the DPR. 

With regards to consolidation, the period of President SBY is indeed the period of consolidation for Indonesia. The SBY government needs not only to consolidate efforts to solve Indonesia’s huge internal problems, but also to reconsolidate the very fabric of Indonesian society. There is now an increasing need to reconsolidate civil society and NGOs as a pillar of democracy. In the last election—as the case since the fall of Soeharto—civil society and NGOs at large have also been pulled into power politics. This is particularly true with the NU when its national chief Hasyim Muzadi decided to run as Vice-Presidential candidate of Megawati Soekarnoputri. Tension and conflict resulted from Hasyim’s candidacy need to be resolved. Otherwise, this largest Muslim organization in Indonesia can not function effectively for a better ordering of Indonesian society as a whole.

In addition, President SBY is expected to continue with fight against rampant corruption. There are some good signs on this; a good number of public official both from the executive and legislative branches have been brought to justice. But there is still a lot of things to be done before Indonesian public can see a significant results of anti-corruption campaign. But, with the same token, Indonesian public in general, should also show their concrete support to President SBY anti-corruption campaign. The anti-corruption campaign, no doubt, is very crucial for the creation of good governance in Indonesia. President SBY has repeatedly talked about the need for Indonesia to develop good governance. Again, there is a lot of reforms needed in public institutions and bureaucracy in order for Indonesia to be able to have a good governance. It is difficult to imagine a better future of Indonesia, unless good governance becomes the order of the day.
 

*This paper is a substantive revision of contribution to discussion on “Islam and the Promotion of Democracy, Good Governance and Pluralism”, in honor of the visit of the Speaker of the Canadian Senate, Dan Hays in Jakarta (January 11, 2005). An early brief version in the form of pointers was presented at “Canada-Indonesia Symposium—The New Shape of Government in Indonesia and Implications for Bilateral Relations”, UBC Center for Southeast Asia Research, Simon Fraser University International and the Consulate General of  the Republic of Indonesia, Vancouver, October 12, 2004.
Last Updated on Thursday, 23 October 2008 22:57